Suh Jin-young: One theory argues that when there are domestic challenges, a country would adopt a hard-line foreign policy to deflect the public attention toward external affairs and strengthen public unity. The other says when a country struggles with domestic issues, it would concentrate on them rather than taking an expansionist policy. The possibility, thus, is fifty-fifty. But my personal view is China would focus more on domestic conundrums.
In the past, however, China sometimes responded strongly to external affairs even when faced with internal upheavals. China fought against the U.S. during the Korean War in the early 1950s when it was struggling just a year after its national foundation in 1949. In 1962, China also went to war against India when it was reeling from the Great Leap Forward. In 1969, it also engaged in an armed border conflict with the former Soviet Union despite extreme ideological division amid the Cultural Revolution. We, thus, should caution against rash conjectures.
I think until at least 2020 when its nominal gross domestic product is expected to match or surpass that of the U.S., China will not take an “adventuristic” policy.
China’s policy has recently seemed adventuristic due to territorial spats in the East and South China Seas (but it wasn’t). From China’s standpoint, the disputes should have been settled when World War II ended in 1945.
Over the past decades, China had remained largely reticent despite pent-up complaints within the international order led by the U.S. and Japan. But it would grow more assertive on the issues where it thinks it has been unfairly treated. The ball is now in the U.S. and the West’s court. The two sides are in a tug-of-war to make adjustments as China’s demands grow. For instance, given its economic scale, China’s voting power in the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank should not be the same as that of any other developing countries. Thus, there needs to be a reform in the world bodies. Should China’s demands be partially accepted, China is unlikely to take a confrontational approach in dealing with the U.S.
KH: What do you think about differences between the contemporary Sino-U.S. rivalry and the Cold War-era conflict between the U.S. and the former Soviet Union?
Suh: One similarity is a balance of terror based on fears about “mutually assured destruction” by the possible use of nuclear arsenals. Because of this, the U.S.-Soviet rivalry remained a cold war. This continues today.
What is different now is economic interdependence. As their economies were clearly separated during the Cold War, their hostile relationship did not inflict any serious economic damage on each other. Until about two decades ago, the U.S. was able to harass China through economic means without itself being hurt at all. But now, things have changed.
KH: Washington calls on Beijing to play by or follow the rules in the international order, which China has not participated in forging.
Suh: What should be clearly distinguished is that China and the former Soviet Union are thoroughly different. The Soviet Union denied the rules and systems the U.S. and the West had forged.
China, however, has joined the order. The Soviet Union wanted a revolution, but China wants a reform within the order. Basically, China accepts the rules, capitalism and market economy, but wants to rectify what it sees as being unfair and unequal in the framework. I think any country, not just China, would move like this.
China is not challenging the order (in my view) as it does not seek to negate the rules of the game. Those in China, who might say “bourgeois are the subjects to be toppled” … these people with anachronistic leftist ideas are in fact hard to find in mainstream Chinese circles now.
KH: What would be notable differences between Xi Jinping and Hu Jintao?
Suh: Hu grew up as a member of the Communist Youth League (a youth movement under the party, which has produced top-echelon leaders and forged a political faction; Li Keqiang, poised to become premier, belongs to it). Hu was from an ordinary family and has thus cultivated an image (of being closer to the grassroots). His image within the confines of the party is like a model student and conscientious leader, but he seems to lack creativity.
But Xi is part of the “Princelings” (an elite clique consisting of high-ranking communist officials’ children and cronies) and has apparently ridden on his father (former Vice Premier Xi Zhongxun)’s coattails while moving up the hierarchy. He had also worked in the relatively affluent coastal regions. Given this, he could be more magnanimous.
Unlike Hu, Xi entered adulthood as China’s reform and openness was in full bloom. Therefore, he could be more active in accepting the changing tide of the world. From a negative standpoint, he climbed up the ladder as he was much affected and exposed to the growing nationalism amid the rise of China. In this regard, under Xi, China could be more assertive in handling external affairs.
KH: The new slate of so-called fifth-generation leaders did not experience any major war themselves, but underwent the Cultural Revolution ― apparently a traumatic experience for them. Would such an experience affect their governing style?
Suh: Given current conditions, which are different from one or two decades ago, for example China’s increased economic prowess, the new leader could be more assertive, from outsiders’ perspectives.
Regarding the revolution, Jiang Zemin and Hu ― the generations before Xi’s ― had viewed it in extremely negative terms, as they experienced the ramifications first-hand of leftists’ ideological extremism.
But for Xi’s generation, the revolution dose not seem to be always negative. For example, Bo Xilai and his leftist fellows were nostalgic for Mao Zedong and the revolution. The reason behind Bo’s decline was quite complicated, but his leaning toward the extreme left contributed to his fall from grace.
Given all this, Xi could take some leftist policies and that could be part of his dilemma. In other words, the neo-leftists pointed to such serious problems as social polarization, calling for a sweeping, thorough revamp to tackle them. New leaders like Xi do not oppose this.
Having said that, the domestic tasks Xi faces are addressing social inequality and polarization, while at the same time, sustaining the country’s economic growth. In terms of foreign policy, the new leadership has a daunting challenge as it has to raise its voice as a responsible power state based on its newfound national strength, and has to demonstrate its capacity to run the world together with the U.S.
KH: There appears to be a balance of power among different cliques or factions within the Communist Party’s top leadership apparatus. How would it affect the decision-making process?
Suh: Not just in Xi’s era. There has been a balance of power among factions, which is one of the most significant characteristics of Chinese politics. Among them, there has been a mixture of conflict and compromise.
Xi could be held in check by his rivals. But one of his strong points, some argue, is that he could be backed by a coalition of the Princelings and the Shanghai Gang (a faction consisting of former President Jiang Zemin and his proteges), while behind Hu is only the Communist Youth League. That argument deserves due attention. But what I pay more heed to is that Xi has connections within the military due to his past military experience (working as secretary to then Defense Minister Geng Biao in the 1980s.). On top of that, his wife is Peng Liyuan (a famous folk music singer belonging to China’s People’s Liberation Army, with a rank equivalent to that of a major general).
Both Jiang and Hu had few military connections in the beginning of their presidency. We are still not sure about whether his military ties would work for or against him, but it is certainly something we should watch.
Should things go wrong, there is a possibility that his connections could lead to generals meddling into politics ― some common phenomena in developing states. But in fact, the Chinese military has a very complicated internal structure. If it wants to intervene in politics, there should be its unified voice in political affairs. But the military is split across ideological, geographical, political lines.
However, the military’s role in China’s politics was still stronger compared with that of the former Soviet Union. The Soviet military had never played any central political role. But during the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese military, then led by Lin Biao, was deeply engaged in politics. The reason Mao Zedong allegedly brought him down was (he) feared the prospect of the possible military-led government. Given this, I remain doubtful over the military venturing to struggle for political power.
KH: The West says China is rising while China sees its newfound national power as a revival. What would be your own description?
Suh: In my books and research papers, I have called it “reemergence.” China is not emerging as a strong power for the first time. It, in the past, had already reached the pinnacle of the world. It bottomed out and is now reemerging, although it has yet to reach the summit. Unlike any other newly emerging states, China has the historical experience and the know-how to run an empire. But this also represents the profound depth of their national pride.
KH: What do you think about possible sources of friction in the Sino-U.S. relations?
Suh: There has been both cooperation and conflict between them on issues ranging from currency and trade policies to human rights and democracy-related matters. The sorest spot for China is the latter issues, which are their wounds into which the U.S. has rubbed, and will continue to rub, salt. In the military realm, the U.S. overwhelms China. But as it grows, it would become more assertive and try to expand its influence. This process appears to be precariously proceeding. From China’s perspective, it wants to expand its areas of operations from the littoral areas further out to the high seas. It is to secure their sea lines of communication, but some misconstrued it as an intention to encroach upon others.
For their conflict management, there are around 60 strategic channels of communication, through which they frequently share their thoughts. What matters is the leaders’ decision and public sentiment. But I have a positive standpoint. Although on many realms, the two powers have continuously clashed with each other, they tacitly agree to prevent their conflict from spiraling out of control and moving on a path of mutual destruction. I, therefore, believe they would resolve their issues peacefully in the end.
KH: Do you anticipate any change in China’s policy toward North Korea?
Suh: There appears to be no solution to the North’s nuclear issue unless Pyongyang changes its own mind. In fact, the nuclear conundrum is sort of a headache for China as well given that there is no benefit whatsoever for China should the North be armed with nukes. This will make China lose its exclusive nuclear power status in the region and could trigger a regional arms race.
On top of this issue, what China is more concerned about is the sudden collapse of North Korea, after which it could fall under the sphere of America’s influence. Thus, it wants to prevent that. The two major policy goals for China are to maintain stability and resolve nuclear problems. These goals apparently clash with each other considering that if it pushes too much for the denuclearization, the North could collapse, and if it seeks to forestall the collapse, the North wouldn’t abandon its nuclear programs. That is the dilemma for China and, of course, for South Korea as well.
We should make conditions, through which the North can be convinced that denuclearization would help ensure its security after all. With three nations of South Korea, the U.S. and China joining hands, we should promise to offer economic, diplomatic and political aid and guarantee this so that we can convince the North that denuclearization is the only way to go. But the process is a long-term one.
KH: What would be your suggestion for Seoul’s diplomacy amid the intensifying Sino-U.S. rivalry?
Suh: We should employ what I dub a “bridging diplomacy.” It is different from playing a role as a balancer. To be a balancer, you should have enough power to mediate between the U.S. and China ― the power Britain held in the 19th century.
Former President Roh Moo-hyun sought to become a balancer in East Asia, but that is, in some sense, an overestimation of our standing. To be a bridge is like a real estate agent. You don’t look for his or her money or influence when choosing a real estate agent. What is crucial is the agent’s credibility and the conviction that the agent is trustworthy enough, would not seek his or her own self-interest and would not inflict any damage on you. It is like a coordinator serving as a bridge between the two powers.
Bridging diplomacy is possible as even though the two powers have conflicts; there is not any serious antipathy toward each other ― the sort of hostility seen in the rigid Cold-War era structure. Ultimately, China and the U.S. believe that they need to meet halfway on some issues. We have a strategic diplomacy with China and an alliance with the U.S. During the Cold War era, the two diplomacies could not co-exist ― you had to choose one side or the other. But in the post-Cold War era, you can do both as you are not forced to choose between them.
Suh Jin-young
● Suh Jin-young, now head of the private Institute of Social Sciences, is known for more than four decades of extensive research on China’s history, politics and foreign policy, and a large number of books and reports on these subjects.
● Suh, 69, taught political science at Korea University for about three decades until 2008. He also heads the state-funded Korea-China Committee dedicated to fostering the two nations’ strategic cooperation.
● Suh earned his bachelor and master’s degrees in political science at Korea University in 1965 and 1969, respectively. He obtained another master’s degree and a doctorate in politics at the University of Washington in 1971 and 1979, respectively.
● Among his popular books are “Chinese Politics in the 21st Century” (2008) and “China’s Foreign Policy in the 21st Century” (2006).
By Song Sang-ho (
sshluck@heraldcorp.com)
