When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations decided to invite the United States and Russia to join the premium leader-led East Asia Summit in July 2010, it had no idea that their presence would impact on the overall pattern of engagement with other dialog partners.
As it turns out, the desire to construct an expansive ASEAN-led regional architecture is being challenged fervently by other non-ASEAN EAS members. They have already collectively demanded to be treated as equal, as the sixth EAS scheduled on Nov. 18, is approaching. This is a red-herring as it could undermine the ASEAN central and its diplomatic conduct over the past four decades.
During the Ad-Hoc EAS senior officials’ consultation in Bali last month, both sides were locked in an argument that the ASEAN centrality must be based on “equal partnership” with other EAS participants namely, China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, New Zealand, the U.S. and Russia. Otherwise, the non-ASEAN members countered the term “ASEAN centrality” should not be used at all. They reiterated that in all previous ASEAN documents including the Kuala Lumpur Declaration (2005) and the Hanoi Declaration (2010), this characterisation of ASEAN was not used. Indeed, the term was first introduced in 2008 as it appeared in the ASEAN Charter’s preamble. Previously, the non-ASEAN members argued correctly that the term “ASEAN as the driving force” was commonly used. They contended if ASEAN wants to do away with “equal partnership,” it has to drop “ASEAN centrality” from the proposed declaration as well.
Presently the EAS agenda and the admission of new members are determined by the ASEAN members only. That has been the practice since the EAS forum was inaugurated at Kuala Lumpur in 2005. Apparently as the external relations of ASEAN with major powers intensifies, the latter’s demand to be treated as equal partnership also increases. The non-ASEAN members have argued that since the EAS is a forum to discuss broad strategic, political and economic issues, they should be able to set and contribute to the EAS agenda as well. In the future issues related to maritime security, nonproliferation, food and energy security and connectivity would also be the EAS main concerns. The ASEAN leaders fear they would lose control of the EAS process if others are allowed to set forth agenda and host the summit.
Liked many ASEAN-led forums, ASEAN has now become a minority when it comes to numbers. In regional and global politics, numbers matters, they increase voices. For instance, the region-wide security forum, ASEAN Regional Forum, began in 1995, now has 17 non-ASEAN members. In addition, nearly 20 countries outside ASEAN have signed up to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia of 1976. Under the treaty’s amended protocol 3, they can now block any new signatory if they have not ratified it. Both the EU and Brazil are waiting for such eventuality before they can accede to the TAC. Obviously, the non-ASEAN members are pressuring ASEAN as they no longer want to be just the grouping’s accessories or minor players.
Early this year, China has proposed and submitted a set of principles that would govern the future EAS discussion. The draft, which is officially known as the Declaration of the East Asia Summit on the Principles of Mutually Beneficial Relations, have been discussed and amended by the EAS senior officials. The two-page declaration will be vetted and subsequently approved by the EAS leaders during the Bali summit. As one of the EAS founding members, Beijing is aware of the challenges of such a powerful leader’s meeting in the region. Leaders can pick up any topic they like to discuss under the five broad themes of energy, finance, education, disaster management and avian flu prevention. But as previous meetings demonstrated including the EAS foreign ministerial meeting in 2010, the sensitive issue of South China Sea was taken up much to the chagrins of China.
The twelve principles contained in the declaration were drawn up from relevant codes of conduct from around the world including the U.N. Charter, TAC, the Indonesian panjacilla and other peaceful coexistence frameworks. To ensure that the EAS future engagements and discussions will promote “friendly and mutually beneficial relations,” the proposed guidelines stringently frame to respect independence and promote sovereignty and territorial integrity.
When the EAS leaders endorse the new code of conduct, it will be the region’s first and most comprehensive. Apart from the non-interference in internal affairs and the non-use of forces in settling disputes, the EAS principles also touched on three new areas: enhancing regional resilience including during economic shocks and natural disasters, respecting human rights and promote social justice as well as promoting maritime cooperation. Given the sensitivity of topic-related to maritime area, the last principle has been diplomatically phrased as “promotion of the ocean as a unifying factor and as public good for enhancing common prosperity of mankind.”
It is interesting to note that as part of the ongoing effort to strengthen its cooperation with ASEAN, the U.S. has been very supportive of its efforts related to peace and security. For instance, Washington has expressed support of the recent ASEAN-sponsored U.N. General Assembly Resolution on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. When it first came out in 1995, Washington was apprehensive viewing the treaty negatively fearing it would weaken its global deterrence system. At the moment, both sides are negotiating for an early accession of the U.S. including other nuclear powers to the Protocol of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone. But some of them have not agreed on the scope of declared special economic zones by Asean.
In a similar vein, for nearly two decades, Burma’s political situation has been the key spoiler of ASEAN-U.S. relations. Now, the ongoing political reforms there have served a new glue of their ties.
Both sides have positive feelings toward each other. The U.S. expressed the hope that Burma would continue to undertake political and economic reforms towards greater national reconsolidation. ASEAN was equally receptive in welcoming Washington’s continuing engagement with Burma.
Now with major global shakers and movers in the EAS, ASEAN has to work closely together and treat them with respect. No EAS country will go against ASEAN as a driving force in the evolving regional architecture if ASEAN has what it takes ― more common positions and policies on issues of global concerns. ASEAN has to earn it. Now with every ASEAN member fully involved and accepted in the EAS, such task is less difficult to attain.
By Kavi Chongkittavorn
Kavi Chongkittavorn is an assistant group editor of Nation Multimedia Group in Bangkok. ― Ed.
(The Nation/Asia News Network)
