The current tension created by North Korea’s nuclear test and long-range missile launch and the South Korean government’s decision to pull out of the Gaeseong industrial park shows how volatile and unpredictable the situation on the peninsula is.
Some even say that the effective closure of the Gaeseong complex, the 12-year-old symbol of inter-Korean economic cooperation and reconciliation, has taken relations between South and North Korea back to the Cold War era.
Indeed, the current situation shows that all the agreements that tied the two sides together -- including the historic accords like the July 4, 1972 Joint Communique, the 1991 Basic Agreement and the June 15, 2000 Joint Declaration -- can become mere scraps of paper in a matter of time.
Specifically, the shutdown of the Gaeseong complex, the brainchild of the historic summit between then leaders Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-il, leads many to believe that the late South Korean president’s “sunshine policy” of engaging the North is now dead in the water.
This calls upon South Korea to reframe its policy and strategy toward the North -- in the short, middle and long terms -- in accordance with the new situation. This will impose heavy challenges for President Park Geun-hye.
In the shortest term, the major challenge for Park will be defending the country from any kind of provocation from the North. Given past actions, it would be strange if the North does not resort to its usual saber-rattling tactic.
It is reassuring in this regard that Park, in close cooperation with the U.S., is moving fast to reinforce defense capabilities. Most notable is allowing the U.S. military to deploy here the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense advanced missile defense system.
While the allies are discussing details of the THAAD deployment, the U.S. has already added one more battery to its Patriot missile interceptor units in the South.
The two allies plan to hold their annual joint military exercise on the largest-ever scale next month, with the participation of major U.S. strategic assets like a nuclear submarine and an aircraft carrier. Security arrangements like these will certainly help deter the North from taking any reckless actions.
Based on such a strong deterrence, Park needs to set the mid- and long-term direction for the Seoul government’s policy toward the North, including how to deal with its nuclear and missile threats.
This of course should include a comprehensive review of her own North Korea policy -- represented by “trustpolitik” and “unification bringing about a bonanza.“ The review should be based on the painful lesson that, like other reconciliatory steps taken by her predecessors, her own initiatives were products of hope and naivete.
The first and most pressing matter that should be considered in formulating a new strategy toward the North is what our goal should be in tackling its nuclear and missile threats -- for instance, removal by outside force, self-destruction or a freeze -- and how far we will go to achieve that goal. This strategy of course should take the geopolitical environment into consideration, especially the roles and positions of the U.S. and China.
The other consideration -- related to the first -- is about how to tackle the Kim Jong-un regime. Should we work toward removal of the dictator in one way or another, implosion of his regime or allow the status quo?
All the questions regarding the North cannot be answered easily, but as the chief executive and the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces at this crucial juncture, Park has the weighty responsibility of steering the country out of the current crisis and charting a new route for peace and stability on the peninsula. Park’s parliamentary address Tuesday must go beyond appealing for national unity and offer clues as to how she will fulfill this duty.
