The possibility of a war on the Korean Peninsula is once again in the spotlight. Robert Manning, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, recently argued that the risk of conflict is the highest it has been since the 1950-53 Korean War. While the timeliness of this assessment is understandable, it is necessary to approach such claims with caution. The argument that the risk of war has escalated sharply is accurate in some respects and exaggerated in others. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have been a constant for decades, and while vigilance is crucial, alarmist conclusions can distort reality. This distortion is not merely theoretical -- it has real-world implications, particularly for South Korea's national image and economic stability. Therefore, a more careful analysis is required.
The Korean Peninsula has faced numerous military tensions and crises since the end of the Korean War in 1953. Some have indeed brought the region to the brink of conflict. For instance, in January 1968, North Korea sent 31 special forces troops to assassinate President Park Chung-hee. Of the North Korean troops, 29 were killed, one went missing, and one was captured. Although the mission failed, it was followed by the seizure of the US intelligence ship USS Pueblo and a series of other aggressive actions, including the dispatching of 120 troops deep into South Korean territory later that year. South Korean forces engaged in a sweeping operation, resulting in the deaths of 113 North Koreans and 61 South Korean soldiers, police officers and civilians -- essentially a small-scale war.
In 1976, the Panmunjom Axe Murder incident brought South Korea, the US and North Korea dangerously close to war, with Washington mobilizing reinforcements and bombers in response to the killing of two US officers by North Korean soldiers. The situation de-escalated only after Kim Il-sung issued an unprecedented apology. In May 1994, the first North Korean nuclear crisis saw the US consider a surgical strike on the North's nuclear facilities -- a plan ultimately shelved through diplomatic negotiations involving former US President Jimmy Carter.
More recently, in 2010, North Korea shelled the island of Yeonpyeongdo, killing four South Koreans, and again, war seemed imminent. South Korea was prepared to retaliate strongly, but US intervention prevented a direct military confrontation. Each of these incidents illustrates the ongoing volatility of the peninsula but also demonstrates a consistent pattern: high tensions do not necessarily lead to war. Recent events, while concerning, are not exceptional in this context.
Kim Jong-un's current campaign of provocation against the South is often cited as evidence that the risk of war is more significant than ever. However, this assessment needs perspective. In March 2013, for example, Kim Jong-un threatened to turn Washington into a "sea of fire" and ordered the North Korean military to be ready for war. In 2015, he issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the South, demanding concessions or threatening serious consequences. These past provocations suggest that while Kim’s rhetoric this year is aggressive, it is not without precedent. The current situation remains within the realm of what we have seen before -- a pattern of escalation and de-escalation.
In the coming weeks, it is possible that North Korea may increase the level of provocation. However, this does not necessarily indicate that war is imminent. Instead, it may represent a strategic pattern of brinkmanship to gain leverage, a hallmark of North Korean behavior for decades.
Analyzing the risk of war on the Korean Peninsula cannot focus solely on North Korea. The policies of South Korea, the United States and China are equally important. Under the current Yoon Suk Yeol administration, South Korea has taken a markedly more hawkish stance toward North Korea in a significant departure from the engagement-oriented policies of the previous administration. This shift has undoubtedly contributed to rising tensions, as the Yoon government has prioritized deterrence and military readiness over dialogue. The Yoon government, which officially defined North Korea as its “main enemy,” has escalated confrontational rhetoric, contributing to the hardening of positions on both sides. North Korea's recent hardline responses might be seen as a reaction to this shift. Kim Jong-un's declaration of a two-state policy and nullification of inter-Korean military agreements were a direct response to the Yoon administration's policies.
Additionally, the broader geopolitical landscape plays a critical role. As US-China tensions continue, the Korean Peninsula is caught in a delicate balance. The US military presence in South Korea, combined with the new US approach to alliance management described as a "lattice-like architecture," further complicates the strategic calculus for North Korea. China's position as North Korea's primary ally also factors in, as Beijing would likely act to prevent instability on its border, making the prospect of a full-scale war less appealing to all parties involved.
While it is undeniable that the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula exists, the claim that it is higher than at any point since 1950 is an exaggeration. Military experts may engage in war-gaming scenarios, but we must recognize the difference between hypothetical risk assessments and the realities on the ground. Alarmist predictions can have unintended consequences. Overstating the danger of war can negatively impact South Korea’s national image, deterring international investment and damaging economic prospects. The exaggeration might deceive the people of South Korea, leading the country to draw an illusory conclusion. South Korea is more than a flashpoint for conflict -- it is a vibrant, modern economy, and alarmist narratives threaten to overshadow this reality.
In conclusion, while it is essential to remain vigilant, it is equally important to avoid distorting the actual level of risk. Balanced and nuanced analysis, rather than alarmism, should guide our understanding of the evolving situation on the Korean Peninsula. Scholars and policymakers alike must consider the broader historical, geopolitical and strategic contexts before concluding that the risk of war is at an all-time high. Mischaracterizing the situation not only distorts reality but also risks undermining South Korea’s position as a prosperous and stable nation.
Wang Son-taek
Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed.
