The Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus outbreak that has gripped the nation since the first case was confirmed on May 20 now seems to be contained, with no new cases reported for two consecutive days as of Monday. MERS has infected 182, claiming 32 lives, and 2,682 remained in quarantine as of Monday.
In hindsight, the government’s initial response to MERS was a failure. Sticking to the guideline that the virus does not spread across distances of more than 2 meters, the authorities failed to cut the chain of infections in the first few days. In its insistence on the 2-meter guideline, the government overlooked the fact that very little is known about MERS, which first emerged in the Middle East in 2012.
The government’s initial refusal to reveal the names of the hospitals where MERS patients had been treated greatly contributed to the spread of the virus in different hospitals. It also created panic among the general public and prevented people who may have been exposed to the virus from reporting themselves.
The health authorities handling of self-quarantine cases should also be reviewed for the failure to promptly identify who may require quarantine and the lapses in monitoring those in self-imposed isolation.
The authorities’ failure to provide appropriate guidelines contributed to hospital staff being infected. It was only on June 17 that the authorities said level-D protective gear should be worn when treating MERS patients. It is thought that even at Samsung Medical Center, a major source of the spread, such protective gear was not issued until June 17.
Perhaps the fundamental cause of the public health risk management failure is the lack of money. Of the Ministry of Health and Welfare’s budget for this year, only 19 percent is earmarked for public health. The lack of medical specialists at the ministry is also glaring. There are only 18 medical specialists at the ministry and 18 medical specialists at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The country has 34 epidemiologists, but only 2 of them are on staff at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
In hindsight, the system was doomed to fail at the slightest strain. Much has been said about the unique Korean culture that may have contributed to the widespread outbreak. At the very core of the problem, however, is health authorities’ inept handling of the outbreak, which, in turn, can find its roots in lack of funding.
