“By establishing such a new institution under his direct control, Xi has tried to control specific issues, while minimizing resistance against his control over them and still retaining the basic structure of the collective leadership,” he said. “This strategy has largely been successful.”
Since Xi took power in late 2012, Beijing has pushed for an array of aggressive external policy initiatives such as the establishment of artificial islands in the South China Sea, the setting up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the “One Belt One Road” project to connect China with the world through “land and maritime silk roads.”
Xi’s personality factors have apparently affected Beijing’s push for these initiatives, Kim pointed out.
Touching on the policy legacies Xi may pursue during his term that stretches to 2022, the professor raised the possibility that he might try to forge a “turning point” in the country’s efforts to unite with Taiwan.
Painting a sanguine outlook for China’s endeavors to enhance soft power, Kim said that China might be “actively” seeking to utilize its soft power diplomacy including public diplomacy as a tool to expand its influence well beyond East Asia.
Following is the interview with Kim.
Korea Herald: What does the “Chinese dream,” put forward by Xi Jinping, mean in terms of its external policy?
Kim Heung-kyu: China used to conduct its external policy with the mindset that it was a developing country. But since Xi took power, China’s self-identity has changed with the nation perceiving itself as a major power, and it has since started talking about the Chinese dream with the world audience. The Chinese dream is that China will seek to be a nation that can confidently talk with any country in the world about its core interests, territory, sovereignty and development, and about world issues on an equal footing, not an asymmetric one. This is not to say that China is eyeing a hegemonic status in an intense competition with the U.S.
China thinks of the 21st century as a multipolar world with itself taking one of the poles. But because of China’s massive size and scale, there has been concern that it may emerge as yet another hegemon. Amid this concern, the U.S. will strengthen its moves to keep China in check. Due to the uncertainties a rising China poses, some other countries will also be apprehensive and could move toward keeping China in check. Then, the situation would become less favorable for the Chinese dream to materialize. Thus, China is apparently being cautious.
KH: Do you think there have been any changes or differences between Xi and his predecessor Hu Jintao in terms of foreign policy?
Kim: National power has changed, and that is at the core of the changes. We can compare China’s national power before and after the world financial crisis (in 2008). Secondly, China’s internal pride and confidence about the changing status of national power has been growing. Thirdly, based on the new status, Xi and his cohorts started to reshape China’s self-identity into one as a major power. They are now at the stage where they are reorganizing China’s global, regional and (Korean) peninsular strategies based on the new identity.
During Hu’s era, China was a developing country, and it couldn’t forge any national grand strategy. For a weak nation to build a grand strategy is realistically impractical. As China prioritized national development back then, foreign policy was always subordinate to the policy of national development. The country also favored peace and stability more, and was reluctant to needlessly waste its energy by getting involved in any conflict. That was China’s mindset in the past.
But as China has emerged as a major power, it wants to show its influence on a global scale, and also shoulder its responsibility to a certain extent. It also wants to forge a long-term national grand strategy that covers not just East Asia, but also the whole world. There are, of course, some consistencies in China’s foreign policy on the surface, but there are shifts stemming from a fundamental change in China’s identity.
KH: Were there any changes in China’s foreign policy that have been prompted by Xi’s personality factors?
Kim: I personally believe a leader’s characteristics are of great importance. To explain international relations, we first need to look at the broad, structural dimension -- in other words, what status that particular nation has in the international system. Then, the second most crucial element is a leader’s traits. If China’s current leader was like Hu Jintao, China would not be carrying out its external policy in a strong, rapid manner. I think there would have been a delay of at least five years (in pushing for ambitious policy initiatives).
Xi is a leader who established himself while overcoming tough tribulations. While serving as provincial leaders in fast-developing regions, he also accumulated ample experience in international dealings, based on which he has developed a strong self-esteem as well as the guts. With all these personality features, he could tighten his grip on power internally, and externally, he could push for his strong foreign policy agenda.
KH: China’s Communist Party has a collective leadership system, meaning Xi does not call all the shots and his decision-making authority should be somewhat limited. How can his personality factors significantly affect China’s external policy?
Kim: Many China experts including myself used to believe that consistency would remain strong in China’s external policy, and that its policy would not change rapidly due to the collective leadership mechanism. They also thought it would not be easy for China to put forward a new national grand strategy for the time being.
Between the eras of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, China had strived to develop and entrench a culture that honors the decisions of the collective leadership. But Xi is a different leader that does not seem to be of Chinese characteristics. Even Chinese people themselves are startled by this. Based on his charisma, he has rapidly consolidated his authority and power, and the current status of his authority seems to have already surpassed the peak of Jiang’s past leadership. Some presume he could even surpass Deng Xiaoping in terms of political authority -- a reason why some call him “little emperor.” Surprisingly, Xi has adopted an approach, through which he can lead the collective leadership system while not destroying it.
To give you a brief rundown on the collective leadership, core Chinese leaders representing each sector (including foreign affairs) become a member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party. They make decisions on major state issues through collective agreement, with the committee members honoring the opinions of a leader specializing in a specific functional area. There are so-called “leading small groups” for each specific matter, where various interest groups coordinate their stances and iron out an agreement, which will then be referred to the Politburo Standing Committee where a final agreement would be naturally reached.
But this decision-making process collapsed during the escalated territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in 2010. Since then, the tradition of respecting each specialty area (of a Standing Committee member) crumbled. At the time, Standing Committee members thought of security as a very important national matter (for which they all should step in to share their wisdom irrespective of their specialties). Each committee member voiced his own opinion, which made it impossible to build a consensus at the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group. At the very critical juncture, the FALSG did not even open. During this tumultuous period, China created the National Security Commission to more effectively handle security and foreign affairs.
The comprehensive commission sits above the leading small group level. Xi chairs the commission while other leading figures join it as members. By establishing such a new institution under his direct control, Xi has tried to take control of specific issues, while minimizing resistance against his control over those issues and still retaining the basic structure of the collective leadership. This strategy has largely been successful.
KH: Xi will remain in power until 2022. What will be the focal points of his foreign policy?
Kim: First of all, (Xi) will try to establish the firm foundation for his country to become economically robust and stable. To this end, Xi should shift China’s socioeconomic structure -- hitherto driven by a rapid growth -- into one that is suited for middle-level growth. To put it specifically, China should transition toward a consumer-driven economy from an export-driven one so that countries around the world would come to China to woo Chinese consumers.
In terms of foreign policy, (Xi) may strive to lay the basic groundwork for China’s influence to be expanded across the entire world -- well beyond East Asia. During his term, China is likely to supplant the U.S. as the world’s largest economy, and to help his country make another leap, Xi would try to cement the basic foundation for China’s security, foreign policy and economy. Part of the efforts is the so-called “One Belt, One Road” initiative.
Thirdly, nothing concrete has emerged about this, but Xi may want to build some sort of legacy that is related to China’s unification. With that legacy, history would remember Xi not only as a leader who guided China to surpass the U.S. in terms of the economic scale, but also as a leader who forged a turning point in the country’s unification efforts. Should all these be fulfilled, Xi could garner the level of respect China’s national founder Mao Zedong enjoyed.
KH: China and the U.S. highlighted areas of mutual cooperation during their summit late last month. How would China deal with its relations with the U.S.?
Kim: One of the reasons why Xi’s foreign policy initially seemed aggressive was that as China’s status has changed into a major power, it adjusted its external policy accordingly -- a process that apparently made China’s policy appear aggressive.
The second reason is related to domestic politics. In the process of Xi tightening his grip on power, he pushed for an anticorruption campaign, which triggered considerable resistance. Although the campaign was quite politically risky, he took advantage of foreign policy to secure domestic public support (for the campaign) and isolate dissenters. In line with this strategy, China confronted the U.S. and showed a firm stance over the issues of territory, security and sovereignty. This enabled Xi to gain tremendous public support. But the problem is that China, given its current level of national power, cannot continue such a strategy.
Thus, Xi sent a strong message to the domestic audience through the APEC summit in November 2014. The message was that we, China, would not antagonize the U.S. and would maintain good relations with the U.S., and that although China is a major power, it is still rising, and it should be cautious when it comes to its external policy.
Such a message reflected China’s cool-headed, realistic evaluation of its own power. Secondly, Xi has considerably consolidated his power in domestic politics (thus little need to use foreign policy to help consolidate power). Thirdly, the U.S.’ pride grew following the shale gas revolution, and the U.S.-Japan alliance got stronger, which increased pressure on China. All these factored in, the strategy that China has apparently adopted is to lay the groundwork with a long-term vision for an enhanced status, while refraining from directly clashing with the U.S.-Japan alliance or the U.S.
China currently anticipates that strong pressure from the U.S. will come, and that regardless of which party wins in the U.S. presidential election, the Sino-U.S. relations will not be on a stable path. Under these circumstances, China has put forward a “new type of great power relations” under which China will seek firstly to avoid clashing with the U.S., pursue coprosperity and thirdly be respected as an equal partner. The U.S. has apparently offered positive answers to the first two demands, but it is against the last one. Thus, China would set a long-term goal to achieve the last one -- to be respected as an equal partner -- and continue to push for it. But China would think situations are not favorable for it to seriously confront the U.S.
China would seek to expand areas of cooperation with the U.S. and mutual prosperity. In terms of military confrontation, China may want to show its presence due to various variables including the domestic political factor. But it would try to avoid serious confrontations. The Sino-U.S. relations would continue to be a mixture of cooperation and competition, as the two countries would compete in a complicated manner to gain the upper hand over the international norms and institutions.
KH: China has focused on bolstering its hard power. But at the same time, it has also paid due attention to cultivating its soft power through various means including public diplomacy, although many seem to downplay the aspect of China’s soft power. What is your take on this?
Kim: China’s mainstream strategists think that the U.S. is obviously stronger than China in terms of hard power. For China to surpass the U.S. in hard power would take considerable time and effort, and the possibility seems to be not that high that China would overtake the U.S. in the overall hard power in the first part of the 21st century. But in the 21st-century world politics, the areas of the non-zero sum game have been expanded, and the importance of soft power has increased. This, spurred by the informatization, has given rise to opportunities to court the hearts of the people around the world.
What China is proud of is its culture, tradition and history, which is richer and more diverse contrary to outsiders’ perspectives. China appears to think that by capitalizing on them, it can build its own soft power, as the U.S. has created the universal values of liberal democracy and human rights. So what we should note is that China is confident of and proud of the quality of its soft power. China also thinks that it should more actively utilize its soft power as a means to expand its influence.
In the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party, China added public diplomacy as the fifth foreign policy pillar. At the congress, a total of the five pillars -- great-power diplomacy, neighborhood diplomacy, diplomacy toward developing countries, multilateral diplomacy and then public diplomacy -- were mentioned. Thus, we can say that China values public diplomacy more than outsiders have thought. Based on its efforts to build soft power, China is apparently trying to build some kind of a (soft power-based) framework through which its influence can be universally accepted.
By Song Sang-ho(
sshluck@heraldcorp.com)
Kim Heung-kyu
● Kim, a political science and diplomacy professor at Ajou University, is a leading expert in Chinese politics, foreign policy and overall security issues concerning Northeast Asia.
● He has authored more than 100 articles, books and policy papers on these issues. Among them are “Chinese Decision-Making and Democratic Centralism” (2004), “The Politics of Fiscal Standardization in China: Fiscal contract vs. tax assignment” (2004) and “The Antisecession Law and Taiwan Straits Relations” (2005).
● He formerly lectured at Sungshin Women’s University. He also served as a professor at the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for five years and as an advisory member to the Presidential Security Council and a regular participant at the Republic of Korea-China Strategic Dialogues.
● He earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees in international relations from Seoul National University and a doctorate in political science from the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor, Michigan.
