For a country’s external policy to fare well, it needs sufficient backing from both within and outside. It is particularly so when it comes to a defense initiative that is costly and could be perceived as a security threat to its neighbors.
Despite its mantra of active contribution to peace, or “active pacifism,” Tokyo’s pursuit of heavier armament and an expanded security role remains a tough sell to both domestic and international audiences, due to its lack of efforts to secure domestic and international support.
The U.S. has, of course, given full support -- if not pressure -- for its core security ally, Japan, to loosen the shackles of its war-renouncing constitution and play an active role to preserve the regional power balance, which has been challenged by the reemergence of China.
However, domestic opposition and neighboring states’ growing suspicions about Tokyo’s intentions are posing a significant hurdle to Tokyo’s push for a “normal” state, which could potentially impede the U.S.’ security policy in Asia as well.
At home, opposition to Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s push for collective self-defense -- the use of force to support its ally, the U.S., under attack -- seems to be greater than once thought.
On Tuesday, more than 11,600 Japanese scholars voiced their opposition to Tokyo’s push for the passage of 11 security bills that would enable its troops to fight around the world to support the military operations of the U.S. under the collective self-defense concept.
This collective opposition came after a survey by Tokyo Shimbun of 328 Japanese Constitution scholars found that 90 percent deemed Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense unconstitutional.
After the ruling Liberal Democratic Party and its coalition partner, New Komeito, passed the security bills in the lower house of the Diet last week, a survey by the Sankei Shimbun and Fuji News Network showed that public support for the Abe government dipped to 39.3 percent, a decrease of 6.8 percentage points from the previous month.
The critics’ opposition seems to underscore their concerns that a cohort of nationalists including Abe are unbridled in pushing to nullify the pacifist constitution when the opposition political forces and civil society have failed to rein them in.
Abroad, opposition to Abe’s hawkish security agenda is even greater.
Koreans still regard Abe’s security drive as a potential security threat, although they do not feel threatened at all by military initiatives that the U.S., Britain or Australia take -- a good case that constructivist theorists may want to cite as an example of how the historical animosities can forge a culture of distrust and affect bilateral ties.
Some Koreans even talk of the seemingly implausible scenario that Japan’s past militarism could reemerge with ultranationalist politicians taking center stage in policymaking, even though militarism can hardly be compatible with a consolidated democracy.
Under the 1947 pacifist constitution, Japan has built a strategic culture that shuns provocative military actions with civilians leading the defense establishments and its government strictly adhering to international norms and law that promote global peace and stability.
Its economic interdependence -- along with the U.S.-Japan alliance that has tamped down possible remnants of Japan’s imperialist ambitions -- has also made it inconceivable for Japan to revert to its past militarism.
The current identity of Japan is totally different from that of the militarist Japan, which was institutionally unencumbered with military leaders wielding an enormous influence in the archipelago state’s policymaking.
But an increasing number of Koreans appear to believe Abe’s nationalist moves could, in the long run, encroach upon their country’s national interests and part of its territory -- the easternmost islets of Dokdo which Tokyo has claimed in its defense white paper for 11 straight years.
The deepening of Korea’s enmity toward its neighbor results largely from the lack of Tokyo’s efforts to build trust with Korea. Some observers say Japan is in a structurally difficult position to forge trust with Korea given its domestic circumstances that may favor a strong, nationalist leader to shore up Japan’s national pride that has been sapped by the rise of its neighbors, social angst emanating from frequent natural disasters and long periods of economic malaise.
Whatever the reasons may be, Japan needs to take sincere steps to improve confidence with Korea, or at least refrain from taking actions that would further provoke Koreans and worsen the bilateral relationship. On Korea’s part, it should be ready to accept Japan’s possible overtures for trust-building.
International relations pundits often say it takes “excruciatingly painful” steps for a country to restore trust with its onetime foe in international politics.
Korea is not asking Japan to take “painful” steps and disarm or to do anything to that effect. Korea wants Japan to face up to history and undertake a security role in a transparent manner that would command the respect of its neighbors rather than sparking a security dilemma for itself. The U.S. may help Japan go in that direction.
By Song Sang-ho (
sshluck@heraldcorp.com)
