[Editorial] China-N.K. ties

Only a few days after Kim Jong-il returned to Pyongyang from a week-long tour, it may be premature to assess the outcome of the North Korean leader’s latest China visit, his third in about a year. News dispatches by official Chinese and North Korean outlets provide few clues to substantial economic gains for the North but the visit again demonstrated the deepening ties between the two neighbors and allies.

Some analysts have determined that Kim returned home empty-handed without winning any firm commitment of massive aid from the Chinese leaders. They particularly noted the absence of North Korean economic officials from the meeting between Kim and Chinese President Hu Jintao, who was accompanied by an array of top economic aides. They understood the asymmetrical conference revealed Kim’s resentment at China’s lack of response to his request for more economic aid.

What was puzzling observers here, however, was the great fanfare given to Kim Jong-il upon his return from the China tour. The Korean Central News Agency reported Sunday that a military song and dance band performed a gala show for Kim Jong-il at an undisclosed place. Kim Jong-un, who greeted his father at the border city of Sinuiju Friday, is believed to have arranged the celebration where a large number of the North’s power elite were present.

There was no such congratulatory event after Kim’s six previous visits to China. The KCNA lauded Kim’s “energetic foreign activities day and night” through more than 6,000 kilometers of travel which made an “imperishable contribution” to the development of the North Korea-China friendship and the prosperity of the socialist country.

The lavish praise is no doubt aimed to make the Northern people and the outside world believe that Kim Jong-il’s visit was highly successful despite the sparse evidence of concrete achievements. The poor North Koreans might be led to appreciate the devotion of their leader, who is still recovering from a stroke three years ago, to getting the country out of economic hardships. Pyongyang leaders also wanted to display the security of the father-son combination in the North’s ruling structure.

No matter how Beijing and Pyongyang may try to convince the outsiders of their rock hard ties, Kim’s three trips to China in a year without return visits by his Chinese counterpart have exposed how desperate he is for China’s help. North Korea has become a virtual vassal state of China and is not in a position to complain about how it was treated by its big brother in Beijing.

While Kim Jong-il was travelling Northeast China without announcement, Chinese Premier Wen revealed to Korean President Lee Myung-bak and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan during a regular summit in Tokyo that the North Korean leader was there to learn about China’s experience of economic development. Meeting Kim in Beijing, Wen obliquely turned down his request for direct Chinese government aid and investment by pointing to the role of enterprise and provincial authorities in the free market system.

Unlike his previous visit in August, Kim did not take his third son and heir apparent Jong-un. Yet, he still wanted to have the dynastic power transition recognized by Chinese leaders as he mentioned the “great historic task” of relaying friendship from one generation to the next. President Hu responded passively by just paraphrasing Kim’s remarks about inheriting friendship.

Kim and Hu discussed reducing tension on the Korean Peninsula and the nuclear issue, the latter being the North Korean chief’s bargaining chip to secure stronger support from China. Kim spoke of his wish to have an early resumption of the six-party talks reiterating readiness for denuclearization. Hu, whether assured by this gesture or not, lectured Kim about the importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula by remaining calm and restrained in disputes, removing obstacles, showing flexibility and improving relations.

As we review Kim Jong-il’s China visit based on the limited official and unofficial information on the top-level dialogue and his provincial tours, we realize the contradiction of China’s growing leverage on the North and the limitation of its influence on its ally in the area of security, particularly on denuclearization. The Chinese know how to apply pressure on the North Koreans but are also aware of the risk of excessive interference.

When it was learned that Kim Jong-il’s train crossed the Chinese border on May 20, many expected significant political and economic developments. Now, we cannot but wonder why the Beijing leadership invited him for what seemed to be sterile conversations and perfunctory banquets. It ended up as just another orientation tour for the stubborn leader on the process of economic openness.

If there was more substance than what was revealed by the official media of the two communist states, we will have to wait to see what it was. One good measure of assessment will be how actively Beijing will push for the resumption of the six-party talks and how positively Pyongyang will comply, possibly through dialogue with South Korea and the United States.

Even before he embarked on his China tour, Kim Jong-il should have known what needs to be done to extract more aid from Beijing. He should now have reconfirmed what the Chinese want, which are economic reform and openness and more flexibility in its stance on denuclearization. The big questions are how many more visits by Kim will actually result in change for North Korea, and whether it will ever change if the Chinese leaders continue their meek approach.