‘Steadfast sanctions key to N.K. denuclearization’

To prevent North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations and force the regime to denuclearize, the international community must apply sanctions steadfastly and extensively, according to a former senior U.S. diplomat.

Robert Einhorn, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and former special adviser to the U.S. Secretary of State for nonproliferation and arms control, stressed that the world must share “a sense of urgency” in pressuring the recalcitrant regime.

“Given the North’s insistence on continuing its weapons program and refusal to negotiate, the only alternative now is to apply pressure,” he said in a seminar titled “Options for dealing with North Korea” organized by the Korea Foundation for Advanced Studies on April 15.
 

“Until this year, sanctions have been too weak. For the remainder of this year, the priority must be pressure. Only if pressure is sharply increased, will there be any prospect of diplomacy making headway.”

Noting that negotiating an agreement on completely eliminating the communist state’s weapons program “will not be possible in the foreseeable future,” Einhorn proposed seeking an “interim agreement” that would freeze its arms pursuit.

Once the North accepts an interim freeze, he added, the international community should launch parallel talks on denuclearization and replacing the Korean War (1950-53) armistice with a permanent peace regime.

“The key to sanctions is whether they will be effectively enforced, especially by China, which has the greatest economic interest in the North and more leverage than the rest of the international community combined,” the former official enunciated.

“In addition to imposing sanctions, the U.S. and its East Asian allies need to strengthen deterrence,” he highlighted, adding that Washington and Seoul have shown the “vitality and strength” of their mutual defense alliance through annual military exercises and by beginning discussions on applying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense missile system.

Regarding the possibility of a fifth nuclear test, Einhorn underlined that China’s imports of coal and iron from North Korea should be scrutinized as part of United Nations Security Council sanctions considered the toughest in history. The “sanctions 2270” includes a “secondary boycott” that imposes penalties on third countries’ individuals, companies and organizations doing business with North Korea.

“There is a certain amount of discretion as to how the sanctions can be implemented, particularly on the import of coal and iron from North Korea to China,” he claimed. “The ban on import applies when there is indication that proceeds from the program supports nuclear and missile programs.”

Einhorn added: “China has a little latitude in interpreting this aspect. The fifth nuclear test would be an opportunity to interpret this position in a very rigorous way, to cut off or severely restrict its import of coal and other minerals.”

Emphasizing the September 2005 six-party joint statement that established denuclearization as the ultimate goal, he pointed out that Pyongyang must not carry out any nuclear weapons tests or flight tests of long-range missiles or satellite launches. “These are the requisites to sitting down” for diplomatic negotiations.

If negotiations were to start, the International Atomic Energy Agency must early on verify the suspension of all nuclear-related activities, including those in the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center -- where fissile materials and light water reactor technology are developed -- as well as those outside Yongbyon for uranium enrichment, he stressed.

Kim Sung-han, international relations professor at Korea University and former South Korean vice minister of foreign affairs, said that policies should aim at transforming or changing the regime in Pyongyang.

“We should avoid dialogue for the sake of dialogue. We should deny North Korea’s attempt at a tactical dialogue to buy time and pursue nuclear development,” Kim argued. “Only when Kim sees nuclear development as choking his regime, will he accept denuclearization. Therefore, we must weaken his regime’s security to the extent that he will forgo his weapons program.”

When sanctions start to hurt, he added, Pyongyang may raise the “freezing card,” but negotiations must be pursued in a context of denuclearization and its verification “in a sincere and lasting manner.”

Kim proposed following recommendations: Seoul extends cooperation with China’s northeastern provinces of Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang that may incur economic losses from the U.N. sanctions; South Korea dismantles the North’s state-owned trading companies in China that keep money flowing into North Korea; China sends a clear signal to the North that it will cut oil supplies in the case of a fifth nuclear test; the U.S., China and South Korea launch a strategic dialogue aimed at coordinating North Korea policies and assessing the sanctions’ effect; and once negotiations start, the three countries cooperate and establish a peace regime on the peninsula.

The peace regime is a broader concept than a peace treaty that includes denuclearization, replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, inter-Korean arms control and diplomatic normalization between the U.S.-North Korea and Japan-North Korea.

Referring to the Iranian nuclear deal, Kim said a “division of labor” between the U.N. Security Council, key parties and other U.N. members would be necessary. In denuclearizing Iran, the U.N. provided background guidelines, while the “P5+1” -- security council members China, France, Russia, the U.K. and the U.S. plus Germany -- and the European Union took lead roles through the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the rest of the U.N. members covered supportive roles.

“Key stakeholders must share a sense of urgency about our final goal: denuclearizing North Korea,” Kim stressed. “They should form a coalition of the willing to deliver effective results.”

By Joel Lee (joel@heraldcorp.com)