China’s quest to become a powerful nation will lever against North Korea’s military provocations and promote multilateral cooperation toward unification, an expert said in an interview with The Korea Herald last week.
Professor Lee Hee-ok, who teaches Chinese politics and China-Korea relations at Sungkyunkwan University in Seoul, said that “China’s Dream” touted by President Xi Jinping will keep Pyongyang’s provocations in check as they directly challenge China’s regional security.
“Xi has called on North Korea to halt and end its nuclear development to prevent an arms race in Northeast Asia, an agenda shared by the U.S.,” Lee said. “Once North and South Korea build a momentum toward unification, China is likely to participate to reap its benefits.”
Lee warned that North Korea’s increasing economic dependence on China poses grave long-term consequences for the unified Korean economy, and it is critical to restart inter-Korean cooperation on a wide range of initiatives.
“Unless we prescribe policies that enable the regime to be part of the international capitalist system and coexist with the market, the North Korean quandary will stay,” Lee stressed.
The Korea Herald: The China-North Korea relations have turned sour after Pyongyang’s last nuclear test in 2013. Beijing has yet to offer an official recognition of Kim Jong-un’s legitimacy. How have the Beijing-Pyongyang ties evolved since President Xi Jinping and Kim Jong-un took power?
Lee Hee-ok: Over the years, the official rhetoric describing China-North Korea relations has changed from a “friendship sealed in blood” (a testament to China’s involvement in the Korean War of 1950-53) to “normal state-to-state relations.” Frankly speaking, they are not traditional allies anymore.
Pyongyang’s third nuclear test in 2013 ― following the first and second in 2006 and 2009 ― is regarded as the turning point; senior level exchanges, which used to occur about 40 times annually, has stalled since; and Xi on multiple occasions said that Pyongyang cannot assume Beijing’s unconditional assistance in the event of a war. Mutual suspicion and dislike have intensified.
This is because Pyongyang has decidedly jeopardized China’s national interests by escalating confrontation and neglecting reform and opening. North Korea’s bellicose acts invited the U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia ― part of the rebalancing or “pivot” toward Asia ― to the detriment of China. As a result, Beijing, which used to be Pyongyang’s “patron,” has become intolerant of its “client’s” wayward behaviors.
KH: There have been increasingly critical voices within China that it should stop condoning its unruly neighbor. Does the Xi government view the Kim regime as a strategic liability or asset?
Lee: China sees North Korea both as a strategic liability and asset. But undoubtedly the North still functions as a buffer zone against the U.S. military presence. Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is one of China’s vital strategic interests. For this reason, Beijing is not willing to let the Pyongyang regime collapse or destabilize.
In the eyes of the Chinese leadership, Kim Jong-un is a highly unpredictable and uncontrollable leader. His father Kim Jong-il, having a shrewd understanding of international politics, knew just the right buttons to push to get what he wanted and acted rather predictably.
But due to his young age and the ambition to flaunt his power, Kim Jong-un behaved like a bouncing football. Beijing has stood by its principle of “no reward for military provocations.” It also pressured Pyongyang to cooperate more with Seoul.
Although Kim has consolidated power after purging his uncle Jang Song-thaek in late 2013, his regime is still sitting on a house of cards. Jang was the chief interlocutor between Pyongyang and Beijing. His purge meant the annihilation of an advisory group capable of planning the country’s future constructively. Consequently, we have seen more of Kim Jong-un’s political will transpire in government policies and actions.
KH: How has China’s rise as a “global superpower” affected its North Korean policy?
Lee: Unlike his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, who viewed the Beijing-Pyongyang ties bilaterally, Xi sees it within a multinational framework. This reflects China’s growing economic, political and military might as a vying, global hegemon.
Despite lagging behind the U.S. globally in military strength, research and development, education, quality of life and other soft-power areas, China believes the “G2” system exists in Northeast Asia. It has thus reframed its relations with the U.S. as a “new type of great power relations.”
To realize “China’s Dream” ― a term popularized by Xi since 2013 to describe “national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and a strengthened military” ― Beijing will not tolerate any country that undermines its regional strategic interests. Xi has called on North Korea to halt and end its nuclear development to prevent an arms race in Northeast Asia, an agenda shared by the U.S.
KH: What is China’s position on unified Korea? How will the U.S.-Korea military alliance change in a unified Korea vis-a-vis China?
Lee: Currently, China does not have a policy regarding a unified Korea. China will want a nuclear-free and ideologically neutral Korea. Korea’s peaceful division is not a bad scenario for Beijing. But once North and South Korea make headways by cooperating, China is likely to play a constructive role to anchor its stakes.
As the threat of North Korea will disappear, the nature of the U.S.-Korea military alliance is also likely to evolve, becoming more flexible. China and the U.S. are more likely to cooperate than clash in and around unified Korea.
KH: What is China’s position on the six-party talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea?
Lee: Beijing has demanded Pyongyang to put forth a clear position on nuclear disarmament. Denuclearization has become the red line the Chinese Communist Party is not willing to redress. Rather than talking with Pyongyang directly, Beijing now prefers a multilateral framework of the six-party talks.
Pyongyang has demanded resuming the talks without conditions. Previously, it asked for security guarantee, financial aid and construction of light water reactors for participating. Seoul and Washington have insisted on the North’s preemptive statement or action to denuclearize. China, meanwhile, has maintained that once the negotiation begins, progress will be made. Beijing also criticized Seoul and Washington for setting the bar too high for Pyongyang to enter the bargaining table.
KH: Why did Beijing oppose referring the Kim regime to the International Criminal Court following the adoption of the human rights issue by the United Nation’s Security Council last December?
Lee: China sees the North Korean human rights issue as sovereign affairs of another country. China and Russia ― the U.N. Security Council permanent members with veto powers ― have signed a partnership of strategic cooperation in 1996, which outlined their position against interfering in other countries’ human rights issues.
China’s rise and its renewed global status have put Beijing in a tough spot over its position on the North Korean human rights issue. To counter international pressure, the CCP has published white papers outlining the improvements in domestic human rights situation.
KH: There has been increasing concern over North Korea’s growing economic dependence on China. Conversely, there are those who say that increased trade and investment with China will help modernize North Korea. Is it a boon or bane?
Lee: North Korea’s increasing economic dependence on China poses grave long-term consequences. When Chinese capitalists invest, build factories in North Korea and extract the materials to China, they create “industrial linkages” that are perpetually difficult to break. Even when South Korean, American and foreign capitals try to penetrate the North Korean market later, the entire business operations will run along the pre-established industrial linkages.
The North has already developed a large trade deficit with China. Nearly 90 percent of Pyongyang’s entire foreign trade ― $7 billion a year ― was with China in 2013. It currently exports minerals and marine products, and since the early 2000s, Chinese firms have invested in North Korea’s infrastructure, agriculture, mining and retail sectors.
Pyongyang is well aware of the dangers and is trying to break out of it by diversifying its diplomacy with Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow and even Washington. It is in Seoul’s interest to take a front seat in the inter-Korean economic cooperation.
KH: North Korea has initiated a series of economic reforms ― “June 28 Measures” and “May 30 Measures” ― to accommodate the growing market. In what direction do you project the market developing in North Korea over the next decades based on China’s reform and opening since 1978?
Lee: The so-called “modernization theory” assumes that following the market expansion, a fledgling middle-class will up their demands for democracy, eventually toppling the authoritarian government. But looking at China’s experience, the state and the market colluded rather than contended. The market and the civil society grew in faithful collusion with the bureaucratic instruments, in stark contrast to the Eastern European liberals that cracked open the Iron Curtain.
North Korea is likely to change along the lines of China: “state capitalism.” Far from being a threat to the regime, the market has the potential to empower the elites’ vested interests. The issue at hand is whether the Pyongyang elites will allow their powers to be institutionalized to accommodate the increasing complexities of burgeoning markets. An institutionalized power is more “flexible” than an autocratic one, because the decisions are made within a safe, predictable range of institutions and legislations.
Doing so will lower the risks of investing in North Korea. Continuing to clench authority will create tensions and schisms, laying the ground for a revolution. If Pyongyang can act as an objective arbiter between foreign and national firms, by setting up fair rules of the game like China did, market can take root in the Hermit Kingdom.
For the North Korean economy to land softly, the external foreign relations should be smooth. Opening North Korea will not happen without recognizing the Kim regime and guaranteeing its survival. If we try to collapse the regime, as President Obama recently said, Pyongyang will only close its doors more tightly. Unless we prescribe policies that enable the regime to be part of the international capitalist system and coexist with the market, the North Korean quandary will stay.
By Joel Lee (
joel@heraldcorp.com)
